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THE INDIAN WARS CONTINUED
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association,
485 U.S. 439 (1988)
I. INTRODUCTION
The Indian Wars, those fought between the Native American Indians and the White
Man, were over by the beginning of the twentieth century. Unfortunately, the Indians' fight
for recognition and equal treatment from the United States Government, the same govern-
ment which demoralized their race, stripped them of their land, and forced them into sub-
mission as a vanquished people, has never ended. The adversary is still the United States
Government, but in its capacity as a lawmaker, not as an army. The same prejudice and
insensitivity that caused and perpetuated the Indian Wars continues today, permeating
laws which affect the Indians and the court decisions interpreting those laws.
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association1 illustrates the continuing
conflict between the Indians and the United States Government, this time in the context of
religion. The United States Constitution, applicable to all American Indians as citizens of
the United States, states that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ... .2 Prohibitions, however, may take
many forms and need not be direct or express in order to effect prohibitive results. Such
was the issue in Lyng, in which the United States Supreme Court made an attempt, albeit
futile, to narrow the finite yet indeterminable definitions of what may, or may not, consti-
tute an unconstitutional prohibition of religion.3
II. FACTS
In 1972 the United States Forest Service began formulating a forest management plan
and, pursuant to that plan, issued a Draft Environmental Statement (DES) for the Blue
Creek and Eight Mile Planning Units of Six Rivers National Forest. 4 The DES was com-
pleted and circulated among Forest Service policy-makers for comment and discussion. In
1975 a Final Environmental Statement (FES), proposing various management plans for
the Blue Creek Unit, was finished.' The Forest Service selected one variation of the plan
and in 1981 completed the Blue Creek Implementation Plan which proposed harvesting
733 million board feet of Douglas fir from the Blue Creek Unit over an eighty-year pe-
riod.6
In conjunction with the Blue Creek Project and to facilitate hauling large amounts of
timber and to control fires, the Forest Service began planning for the upgrading, paving,
and completion of the Gasquet-Orleans Road (G-O Road).7 The finished project would be
1. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
2. U.S. CoNST. amend. I.
3. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
4. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586, 590 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
5. Id.
6. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d 690, 699 (9th Cir. 1985).
7. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2-3, Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
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a seventy-five-mile stretch of road between Gasquet and Orleans, California. Fifty-five
miles of the road was to lie within the Six Rivers National Forest. By 1977, forty-nine of
those fifty-five miles were complete, with only a six-mile strip between the Summit Valley
and Dillon-Flint sections unfinished. 8 This six-mile strip lay within the Chimney Rock
Section of the Six Rivers National Forest. More specifically, Chimney Rock lay within the
Blue Creek Unit. 9
As part of the plan to complete the G-O Road, the Forest Service issued a Draft Envi-
ronmental Impact Statement (EIS) on the unfinished portion of the road in 1977.10 In re-
sponse to comments on the EIS, the Forest Service commissioned a study by an
independent group, headed by Dr. Dorthea Theodoratus, to evaluate the religious and cul-
tural significance of specific sites within the Chimney Rock Section and their importance
to the Yurok, Karok, and Tolowa Indians. 1 The group completed its study in 1979, and
the subsequent report, Cultural Resources of the Chimney Rock Section, Gasquet-Orleans
Road, Six Rivers National Forest, concluded that, in deference to the immense harm it
would cause to the Indians' religion and culture, the road should not be built.1 2
This recommendation was rejected by the Forest Service, which issued a final EIS in
1982. In the final EIS, several proposals were made for the completion of the remaining
six miles of road.1 3 The options presented drew various paths for the road through the
Chimney Rock Section. Options which circumvented the Chimney Rock Section alto-
gether were rejected. Eventually, the Forest Service selected one of the plans which called
for the construction of the road through the Chimney Rock Section of the forest. 4
In its final plan the Forest Service proposed to limit timber harvesting to areas at least
one-half mile away from all Indian religious sites identified in Dr. Theodoratus' study in
order to reduce the impact of the road on those sites.' 5 The Forest Service chose the path
for the road that would affect those sites the least.' 6
The Indians, however, did not agree. They perceived both the timber-harvesting plan
and the G-O Road plan as potentially destructive to their religion and its accompanying
rituals as well as to the Indians' day-to-day existence and believed the only successful solu-
tion was to prevent either plan from being implemented. Having exhausted their adminis-
trative remedies, the Indians brought an action seeking to enjoin the construction of the
G-O Road.
III. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association v. Peterson17 was a consolidation of
Northwest and another action brought by the State of California regarding the Blue Creek
8. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Lyng.
9. Northwest, 565 F Supp. at 590.
10. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Lyng.
11. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 442; see Appendix, Appendix K to Defendant's Exhibit G, Lyng.
12. Appendix at 193, Lyng.
13. Northwest, 565 F. Supp. at 590.
14. Appendix at 95, Lyng; see also Northwest, 565 F. Supp. at 590.
15. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Lyng.
16. Appendix at 91-95, Lyng.
17. 565 F. Supp. 586 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
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Implementation Plan. In Northwest, the plaintiffs alleged nine violations of constitutional
and federal statutory rights. 
18
Approaching the first amendment issue, the district court stated that the unorthodox
character of a religion does not form a basis for denial of free exercise clause rights; there-
fore, the religious importance of the land to the Indians was not in issue.1 9 The district
court did give considerable discussion to the character and nature of the disputed area. The
court found that the entire northeast corner of the Blue Creek Unit, known to the Indians
as the "high country," was sacred to the Indians.20 The court further noted that the Indians
regularly used the "high country" for numerous religious purposes which could be charac-
terized as the quest for religious power and guidance through spiritual exchange with the
creator.21 Vital to receiving power from the creator were the "prayer seats," specific sites
within the disputed territory which had to be used in conjunction with the solitude, peace,
and pristine conditions of the Chimney Rock Section if power was to be attained.2 2 The
district court, in making its finding of facts regarding the Indians' religion, relied heavily
on Dr. Theodoratus' report which the Forest Service had commissioned.
After discussing the nature of the Indians' religion and its relationship to the land at is-
sue, the court addressed the Indians' specific allegations regarding the potential harmful
effects of the proposed project. Those allegations were (1) that the visibility of "the road
from religious sites would damage visual conditions" essential for religious use, (2) that
the "increased aural disturbances" accompanying the road would impair the religious and
medicinal quests in addition to the attainment of power, and (3) that the Indians' religious
use would be impaired by increased recreational use.23
In ruling on the allegations, the court noted that the Forest Service had conceded that
the Indians' use of the "high country" was entitled to first amendment protection even
though the Indians had no property interest in the disputed territory.24 The court found
evidence which established that construction of the Chimney Rock Section and/or imple-
mentation of the Management Plan would seriously impair the Indians' use of the high
country for religious purposes. 25 The court emphasized that the high country was central
and indispensable to the Indians' religion since it represented the center of their spiritual
world and, as such, was irreplaceable. 26 The court, citing the Forest Service's own report,
18. The claims were that the projects: (1) violated the Indians' first amendment rights, U.S. CONST. amend, 1; (2) violated the
American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (Supp. 111979); (3) violated the National Environmental Policy Act,
42 U.S.C. §§4321-4361 (1976); (4) violated the Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1976); (5) violated the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976); (6) violated the water and fishing rights reserved to American
Indians on the Hoopa Valley Reservation; (7) violated the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976); (8) violated the
Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1976); and (9) violated the National Forest Management Act, 16
U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (1976).
Only the constitutional issues are to be discussed in this note. By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the Forest
Service had conceded that it could cure the statutory defects and would not challenge the statutory rulings.




23. Id. at 592.
24. Id. at 594.
25. Id. at 594-95.
26. Id. at 594.
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found the planned projects potentially destructive of the" 'very core' "of the Indians' reli-
gion.2 7
By establishing their right to first amendment protection by proving an unconstitutional
"prohibition" of their religion, the Indians shifted the burden of proof to the government to
prove a compelling governmental interest. The government offered the following justifi-
cations: (1) the increase in the quantity of timber accessible to harvesting in the Blue
Creek Unit; (2) the stimulated employment in the regional timber industry that would
result; (3) the increased recreational access to the Blue Creek Unit; (4) the increased effi-
ciency of the Forest Service in caring for the forest; and (5) the increased price of bids on
future timber sales. 2 8 In responding to the government's statements, the court noted: (1)
that the Forest Service had conceded that the construction of the Chimney Rock Section
would not improve access to timber resources; (2) that no net increase in jobs would result,
but only a transfer of existing jobs from Humboldt County to Del Norte County; (3) that
recreational access could not support a violation of the Indians' first amendment rights; (4)
that the road would not make servicing the park any more efficient; and (5) that the sup-
posed increase in bids was too speculative.2 9 The court also concluded that the establish-
ment clause would not be violated by granting the Indians' request for relief since the
Indians were not seeking, nor would relief result in, the exclusion of others from the for-
est. 30 Based upon these findings, the court issued a permanent injunction forbidding the
Forest Service from pursuing either the Blue Creek Management Plan or the G-O Road
project.3 '
While appeal to the Ninth Circuit was pending, Congress enacted the California Wil-
derness Act of 1984.32 The Act designated almost the entire disputed area as a wilderness
area and, as a result, banned logging and all other environmentally desecrating actions in
order that the area would be left in its pristine condition.3 3 The Act left a 1200-foot-wide
strip unprotected to allow for the completion of the G-O Road if the Forest Service decided
to complete the project.34 Congress thus seemed to be taking a neutral position regarding
the road's completion.
With the passage of the California Wilderness Act, the case had taken on a different di-
mension by the time it reached the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Association v. Peterson,35 the court of appeals followed the decisions of
other courts of appeal and held that the Indians had the initial burden of demonstrating that
the government's actions unconstitutionally violated their first amendment rights. 36 The
court noted that the Indians were required to show that the area at issue was an indispensa-
ble part of and central to their religious practices and that the proposed government actions
would seriously impair or prohibit the practice of their religion.37 Upon review, the court
27. Id. at 595.
28 Id
29. Id. at 595-96.
30. Id. at 597.
31. lId. at 606.
32. Pub. L. No. 98-425, 98 Stat. 1619 (1984) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1132 (Supp. IV 1985)).
33. Northwest, 795 F2d at 691.
34. Id.
35. 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986).
36. Id. at 69 1.
37. Id. at 692.
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of appeals deferred to the district court's findings concerning the nature of the Indians' reli-
gion, their use of the disputed territories, and the project's potentially destructive effects.
38
The court recognized that there was considerable evidence in the record indicating the
indispensable character of the territory to the Indians.39 It noted that the Indian tribal and
religious leaders went to the high country to receive the spiritual power which permitted
them to fulfill the duties central to Indian life. 40 The court characterized the high country
as "essential" and the government's projects as "utterly inconsistent" with the Indians' reli-
gion .41
The effect of the G-O Road in particular, the court said, was not as clear. That the proj-
ect would adversely affect the Indians was certain, but the burden seemed to be of an indi-
rect nature.42 Despite this indirect burden, the court determined that the Indians had met
their burden of proof regarding the road's adverse effects and its resulting interference with
the free exercise of their religious freedom.43
In addressing the establishment clause issue, the court reiterated that the Forest Service
had acknowledged that the Indians were entitled to at least some first amendment protec-
tion." The court held the district court's injunction was not a violation of the establish-
ment clause since the Forest Service remained free to administer the park as it saw
necessary regarding all activities except logging, which issue had been substantially re-
duced in importance as a result of the California Wilderness Act and the completion of the
G-O Road. 45
The court also found that the government had failed to show a compelling governmental
interest adequate to justify a first amendment infringement. According to the court, the
government had sought to justify its position based upon its prerogative to manage its for-
ests in the usual manner within the statutory guidelines. As a result the court affirmed the
district court's holding in part, vacating the parts of the injunction concerning the Manage-
ment Plan and the G-O Road since they had been rendered moot by the California Wilder-
ness Act.48
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association4 7 undoubtedly appealed to the
interest of the United States Supreme Court because the case presented novel facts involv-
ing an old but vital issue which the Court wished to address. The Supreme Court decision
represented an attempt to further refine what constituted an unconstitutional first amend-
ment prohibition of the free exercise of religion. The case also represented the conver-
gence of two distinct lines of cases. The first line of cases is a group of factually related
cases decided by the Court within the last twenty years. The majority of the cases involved
the state government's denial of employment benefits to individuals who were fired be-





42. Id. at 693.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 694.
46. Id. at 698.
47. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
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other employment.4" The Court consistently ruled in favor of the plaintiffs-the unem-
ployed -noting that a state could not compel an individual to act in a manner inconsistent
with his religious beliefs nor discriminate against those who held religious views contrary
to those of the authorities.' 9 The Court viewed the denial of benefits to the unemployed as
penal and coercive since the denial forced plaintiffs to choose between violating their reli-
gious beliefs by working on their sabbaths or remaining unemployed and uncompensated.
Another case involving similar principles, but not involving unemployment benefits,
was Wisconsin v. Yoder."0 The case dealt with an Amish family who refused to send their
child to public or private school past the eighth grade, in direct violation of a Wisconsin
compulsory school-attendance law which carried criminal sanctions for such violation.
The parents' refusal to send their child to school past the eighth grade was based on histori-
cally and religiously founded beliefs that conventional education beyond the eighth grade
exposed children to many facets of life that were inconsistent with and in direct opposition
to those values taught and held indispensable to the Amish religion. 5
The Court noted that there was nothing inherently wrong with the Wisconsin statute or
the penalties imposed on those who did not comply. But, with regard to the plaintiffs, the
Court said: "A regulation neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the
constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exer-
cise of religion." 2 The Court held that the statute as applied to the Amish was an unconsti-
tutional burden upon their freedom of religion, since to comply with it, and thereby avoid
criminal sanctions, would require a violation of their religious tenets.5 3 That kind of com-
pulsion, the Court stated, was the very type of violation the first amendment was designed
to prohibit. 4 The Court further recognized that Wisconsin had a compelling state interest
in enacting and enforcing a compulsory attendance law.5 5 Nevertheless, that interest could
not override those of the Amish since it could not be proven that the Amish children's edu-
cation suffered as a result of the Amish practice.
Another case presenting similar issues was heard by the Court the year before the in-
stant case. In Bowen v. Roy, 58 the Roys applied for and received benefits under the Aid to
Families with Dependent Children program and the Food Stamp program. However, the
Roys refused to comply with the statutory requirement that they furnish a Social Security
number for each household member to the state agency which administered the pro-
48. See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd., Ind. Empl. Sec.
Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
49. See Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 144 ("[The forfeiture of unemployment benefits fbr choosing the former [fidelity to religious
beliefs] over the latter [continued employment] brings unlawful coercion to bear on the employee's choice."); Thomas, 450 U.S.
at 717-18 ("Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it
denies such a benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an adherent to mod-
ify his behavior and to violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists."); Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 410 ("South Carolina may not
constitutionally apply the eligibility provisions [of its unemployment compensation act] so as to constrain a worker to abandon his
religious convictions respecting the day of rest.").
50. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
51. Id. at 207-09.
52. Id. at 220.
53. id. at 218.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 221.
56. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
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grams.5 7 The Roys argued that obtaining a number for their two-year-old daughter, Little
Bird of the Snow, would "rob her of her spirit."5 8 At trial it was divulged that Little Bird
had already been assigned a number. Upon re-call to the stand, Mr. Roy testified that it
was the use of the number which would rob Little Bird of her spirit.59 The district court
subsequently enjoined the state from using the number and denying the Roys' benefits.60
The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case. Chief Justice Burger
noted that some religious beliefs must yield to the common good of all and that the statute
in question was not only neutral on its face but served a legitimate public interest.61 He
also noted that preventing fraud was a significant compelling interest and that the Social
Security number served that purpose.62 Most importantly, however, Chief Justice Burger
stated that "[tihe Free Exercise Clause simply cannot be understood to require the Govern-
ment to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that comport with the religious beliefs of
particular citizens. 63
The other line of cases which were factually similar were heard by courts of appeal in
different circuits and yielded surprisingly consistent results until Lyng. Each case involved
a government land project to which the plaintiffs, in each case Indians, objected on the
ground that the project would impair the practice of their respective religions.64 Each
time, the courts applied a compelling-interest analysis, the same one used in the instant
case, which stated (1) that the Indians must demonstrate that the government action cre-
ated an unconstitutional burden on the exercise of their religion, and (2) that if the Indians
met their burden of proof, the burden would then shift to the government to demonstrate a
compelling governmental interest.65 In each case the court held that the Indians had not
met their burden of proof. Whether a compelling interest existed, therefore, was never
really at issue. 
66
In Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association v. Peterson,67 a court of appeals for
the first time ruled in favor of the Indians under a factual situation nearly identical to those
cases in which the Indians had not been successful in their free exercise claim. As the
Ninth Circuit stressed, "[t]he adoption of a balancing test [presents] the distinct possibility
that, on a different record [e.g., Northwest], the Indians may prevail. '"68 The Indians had
57. Id.
58. Id. at 697.
59. Id. at 696-97.
60. Roy v. Cohen, 590 F. Supp. 600, 612-13 (M.D. Pa. 1984).
61. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. at 702 (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252,259 (1982)).
62. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 709.
63.1d. at 699.
64. See Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Hopi Indians sought to prevent further development ofa recreational
ski area in the San Francisco Peaks region of Coconimo National Forest.); Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981) (Navajo Indians challenged the government's operation of Glen Canyon Dam and the manage-
ment of the Rainbow Bridge National Monument on the grounds that flooding denied them access to sacred areas and tourists
desecrated sacred areas.); Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980)
(Cherokee Indians sought to enjoin the completion of the Tellico Dam alleging it would flood sacred land.); Crow v. Gullet, 541
F. Supp. 785 (D.S.D. 1982), aftd, 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1983) (Lakota and Tsistsistas Indians argued that construction had
interfered with Bear Butte, an area of religious significance in the Black Hills, and that the restrictions and regulations regarding
visitation to the area interfered with their religious practice.).
65. See Wilson, 708 F.2d at 740; Badoni, 638 F.2d at 176; Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1163; Crow, 541 F. Supp. at 789.
66. See Wilson, 708 F.2d at 744; Badoni, 638 F.2d at 177; Sequo)uh, 620 F.2d at 1164; Crow, 541 F. Supp. at 791,793.
67. 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986).
68. ld. at 695.
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met their burden of proof, and the government had failed to meet its. Because of the seem-
ingly inconsistent courts of appeals' rulings and the opportunity to further define a first
amendment prohibition, the case was obviously ripe for consideration by the Court.
IV. INSTANT CASE
The Court granted certiorari" on the constitutional issue alone. As previously noted,
the government had conceded that all the statutory issues could either be resolved or would
not be challenged. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association70 was decided
on April 19, 1988, with Justice O'Connor delivering the majority opinion in favor of the
government.
After reviewing the record and discussing the nature of the Indian religion, Justice
O'Connor once again noted that the sincerity of the Indians in their belief was not in dis-
pute. 71 Before undertaking any further explanation, she also acknowledged that the pro-
posed actions of the government would have "severe adverse effects on the practice of their
religion. 72
In her opinion Justice O'Connor emphasized the correlation between the instant case
and Roy,73 stressing Chief Justice Burger's observation that the free exercise clause could
not be understood to require the government to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that
would be consistent with individual religious beliefs.74 Based on this, she concluded that
"[tihe building of a road or the harvesting of timber on publicly owned land cannot mean-
ingfully be distinguished from the use of a Social Security number in Roy."75
Justice O'Connor found no government coercion nor any action by the government
which could be characterized as a penalty against the individual's religious activity either
in Roy or in the instant case, despite the possible "devastating effects on traditional Indian
religious practices. 76 As Justice O'Connor emphasized, the crucial word in the free exer-
cise clause is "prohibit."77
Although the Court acknowledged that it should not pass judgment on the truth of the
underlying religious beliefs of those asserting a free exercise right,78 Justice O'Connor did
"seem[ ] less than certain that construction of the road [would] be so disruptive that it
[would] doom [the Indians'] religion .79
In the opinion, Justice O'Connor continually emphasized that the government could
not operate in an efficient or sensible manner if it had to conform its activities to the indi-
vidual religious requirements of the populace. 80 Coincident with this is the Justice's ac-
ceptance of the Forest Service's view that it is the government's prerogative to manage its
forests in the standard manner outlined by the various relevant statutes. 8' Justice O'Con-
69. 481 U.S. 1036 (1987).
70. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
71. Id. at 447.
72. Id.
73. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
74. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 448.
75. Id.
76. id. at 449.
77. Id. at 451.
78. Id. at 449.
79. Id. at 451.
80. Id. at 452.
81. Id. at 453.
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nor also pointed out the efforts made by the Forest Service to accommodate the Indians.
Noting Judge Beezer's observation in his dissent in the Ninth Circuit that the Forest Service
had provided a ten-step plan to alleviate the effects of the proposed projects,82 Justice
O'Connor concluded that the Forest Service had considered the Indians' welfare through
its final choice of the proposed route for the G-O Road, choosing the route which would be
the least disruptive. In the Court's opinion, the only other step was to terminate the proj-
ects altogether.83
Writing for the dissent, Justice Brennan found an obvious and blatant prohibition since
he perceived that the inevitable results of the Forest Service's projects made the Indians'
practice of their religion impossible.8 Justice Brennan placed much more emphasis on the
nature of the Indians' religion and its site-specific nature. Justice Brennan, unlike Justice
O'Connor, considered the test previously employed by the courts of appeal in similar cases
and used the district court's rationale in ruling in the Indians' favor in the instant case.
85
Whereas Justice O'Connor accepted the tenet that the government had a compelling inter-
est in completing the projects, Justice Brennan found no such interest, especially in light of
the California Wilderness Act.86
Nor did the dissent find the instant case comparable to Roy. Unlike the majority, the
dissent saw no relationship between the two cases and was unable to join in the majority's
characterization of the Forest Service's management of the Six Rivers National Forest as a
purely "internal" procedure. 87 The dissent found that the Indians had proven an unconsti-
tutional burden upon their religious freedom and that the government had presented no
compelling interest to justify a first amendment infringement.88
V. ANALYSIS
In Thomas v. Review Board, Individual Employment Security Division,89 the Court noted
that "religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent or comprehensible to oth-
ers in order to merit First Amendment protection." 90 If those beliefs are illogical or incom-
prehensible to the Court upon initial review, then the Court has a duty to undertake every
effort to ascertain and understand those beliefs so that the effects of government action and
the compelling interest of the government may be weighed accurately and objectively.
Specifically, application of the courts of appeals' compelling-interest analysis used in free
exercise cases necessitates this understanding. It is crucial in analyzing Lyng, as well as in
82. Northwest, 795 F.2d at 703.
83. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 454.
84. Id. at 458-59 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 473-74 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 465 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 470 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 476-77 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
89. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
90. Id. at 714.
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any other alleged free exercise violation, to understand the nature, beliefs, and practice of
the religion in question. 91
In Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association v. Peterson,92 the court of appeals
restated the compelling-interest analysis which had been applied by the other appellate
courts in factually similar cases: The Indians had the initial burden of demonstrating that
the government's action created a burden on the free exercise of their religion.93 As the
United States Supreme Court had previously stated," '[i]f the purpose or effect of a law is
to impede the observance of one [religion] . . . ,that law is constitutionally invalid.' ,94
The burden on a religion need not be a direct one, for indirect burdens" 'undoubtedly have
the same coercive effect upon the exercise of First Amendment rights as imprisonment,
fines, injunctions, or taxes.' ,95 Indeed, even Justice O'Connor acknowledged this point in
the instant case.
96
There can be no doubt that the implementation of the G-O Road proposal, even if its
effects were indirect as the court of appeals hypothesized, 97 would impede and unduly bur-
den the Indians' free exercise of their religion. Under Justice O'Connor's analysis, how-
ever, "impede" and "unduly burden" may be insufficient since, as she stressed, the crucial
91. The Yurok, Karok, and Totowa Indians all subscribe to the same general religious beliefs. Basic to their religion is the idea
that the high country, generally the Chimney Rock Section of Six Rivers National Forest, was placed there by the Great Creator as
a place where the Indians could go to communicate with the creator and to draw religious power. Brief for Respondents, State of
California, at 3, Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988). At specific sites within the high
country are "prayer seats." These seats are so specialized that there are specific seats designated for the reception of specific
medicines or of specific power needed to perform a specific task. Northwest, 565 F. Supp. at 591. It is at the prayer seats, the
Indians believe, that guidance and power are received. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Lyng.
The prayer seats are positioned in ascending degrees of personal power. Brief for Respondents, State of California, at 4, Lyng.
These ascending degrees directly correspond with the geographical hierarchy; the greater the power, the higher a prayer seat is on
the particular slope or rock. Id. Each prayer seat is oriented to achieve an unobstructed view of the high country, facilitating
concentration. Id. at 7. The success or failure of the individual attempting to receive guidance and power depends on his ability to
concentrate and, eventually, to enter a trance. Id. at 8. While the individual is in that trance, visions and sounds may be received
as signs from the spirits that the quest for power has been granted. Id. Absolutely essential to the quest and to the Indians' reli-
gious practice are privacy, peace, silence, and, ideally, a completely natural, pristine, and undisturbed setting. Id. at 5.
In the Chimney Rock Section, the prayer seats are all positioned on the high, steep, rock outcroppings within the area. Id. at 4
& n.2, Lyng. Those of the greatest significance are Chimney Rock, Peak 8, and Doctor Rock. The Chimney Rock seats face
outward across a valley and down the slope. Id. Those seats are located near the very top of Chimney Rock, and it is there that the
Indians believe great power is received. Id. Peak 8 is two to three miles down the slope and is considered to be the very center of
the spiritual world. Id. Across the valley and up another slope is Doctor Rock. The prayer seats here face Chimney Rock and,
more specifically, Peak 8. Id.
The exchange of power and guidance is vital for key tribal members since, in order to perform tasks beneficial to the entire
tribe, and in their view, to the entire world, great power must first be attained. Id. at 3. Among these key individuals are the
medicine women, who travel to the high country to pray, receive power, and gather medicines. Id. at 3-4. The Indians believe
that, upon return to the tribe after a sabbatical to the high country, these women are able to heal the sick and to administer the
power they have gained in the high country through ceremonies such as the Brush and Kick Dances. Id.; see alsoNorthwest Indian
Ass'n, 565 F. Supp. at 591-92.
Even more important to tribal life are those members who must gain power and guidance prior to participating in such dances as
the White Deerskin and Jump Dances. Id. These two dances, as well as others, are part of the World Renewal process which
stabilizes and preserves the earth and prevents catastrophe. Id. The prayer and power gained in the high country are essential to
ensure success in the entire renewal process. Id.
92. 795 F.2d 690 (9th Cir. 1985).
93. Id. at 691.
94. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404 (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961)).
95. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404 n.5.
96. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 450-51.
97. Northwest, 795 F2d at 693.
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word in the free exercise clause is "prohibit."98 Regardless of semantics, the net result is
the same.
As previously noted, the practice of the religion, and therefore its success, depends on
the practitioner's being able to participate and concentrate at the prayer seats. Necessary to
the process of gaining power and guidance from the spirits and the creator are peace, si-
lence, solitude, privacy, and an undisturbed, pristine setting. 99 The construction and com-
pletion of the road would have an adverse effect on these very qualities which are
abundantly available in the disputed area and which make communication with the Great
Creator, achievement of power, and the success of the various ceremonies certain. One
need only recall that the prayer seats face outward and down the slope of Chimney Rock
and Peak 8 and back across the valley from Doctor Rock toward these two areas, particu-
larly Peak 8. The proposed G-O Road would be built in the valley between the two slopes.
Few things can be considered more distracting and less pristine or natural than the con-
struction of a state road and, upon its completion, the resulting stream of traffic.
The result of the area's development is the destruction of the conditions necessary for
attainment of power. Without these conditions, those individuals who are vital to the sur-
vival of the Indian religion and way of life, those who participate in the World Renewal
dances, and those who heal the sick, cannot gain the power needed to make their respec-
tive ceremonies effective. To one who devoutly believes in these ceremonies, the result is
that the World Renewal process fails in its purpose to preserve and stabilize the earth and
catastrophe becomes inevitable. The Brush and Kick Dances are meaningless as well, im-
parting no healing power or possible salvation to the sick.
As Dr. Theodoratus concluded in her report to the Forest Service:
Field data indicate that the increased intrusion into this sacred region would adversely affect
the ability and/or success of the individual's quest for spiritual power . .. [Tihe Indian con-
cept of World Renewal is inextricably related to religious practice in the high country. Intru-
sions on the sanctity of the Blue Creek high country are therefore potentially destructive of the
very core of the Northwest religious beliefs and practices.
100
While the government has not expressly "prohibited" the practice of the Indians' reli-
gion, one can think of nothing more prohibitive than making communication with the cre-
ator impossible. Without that communication, those ceremonies which determine the
outcome of life and the preservation of the earth become ineffective, thereby making the
onset of death and destruction certain in the minds of the devout believers.
Justice O'Connor recognized the "severe and adverse effects" that the government's
projects would have on the Indians' religion no less than three times in the majority opin-
ion.101 Since the crucial word is "prohibit," the majority is able to avoid the obvious con-
clusion that an unconstitutional infringement on the Indians' religion had occurred by
merely not using that specific term. The instant case hinges on whether the effect of the
98. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 451.
99. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Lyng.
100. Appendix at 193, Lyng.
101. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 447 ("It is undisputed that the Indian respondents' beliefs are sincere and that the Government's pro-
posed actions will have severe adverse effects on the practice of their religion."); id. at 451 ("We have no reason to doubt, that the
logging and road-building projects at issue in this case could have devastating effects on traditional Indian religious practices.");
id. ("Nevertheless, we can assume that the threat to the efficacy of at least some religious practices is extremely grave.").
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government's action amounts to a "severe and adverse" prohibition of a group's religious
observance.
Furthermore, it is hard to understand how the majority can maintain that it is incapable
of determining the truth of the Indians' religious beliefs,102 and subsequently state that "it
seems less than certain that construction of the road will be so disruptive that it will doom
[the Indians'] religion."10 3 The Court is either skeptical about those beliefs, or it is ruling
on the case de novo.
Justice O'Connor also placed a great deal of emphasis on the fact that the Forest Service
tried to minimize the impact of the project.1 0 4 Noteworthy as those efforts might be, they
are to no avail if they render the Indians' practice of their religion impossible.
Finally, with regard to the effect of the G-O Road project on the Indians, it is ironic that
in all the discussion concerning Roy and its pertinence to the instant case, Justice O'Connor
failed to mention that she dissented in part to Chief Justice Burger's conclusion that the only
way a free exercise claim could defeat a "neutral and uniform" government proposal which
promoted a legitimate public interest was if the opponent to the proposal was to prove dis-
criminatory intent.10 5 In response to this reasoning, Justice O'Connor stated: "I would
apply our long line of precedents to hold that the Government must accommodate a legiti-
mate Free Exercise claim unless pursuing an especially important interest by narrowly tai-
lored means. 10 6
The logical question to ask is whether there was an important government interest in
seeing the G-O Road project completed. Both the district court and the court of appeals
found none; therefore, it is surprising that the government's interest received elevated sta-
tus upon the case's arrival in the Supreme Court. The interest in seeing the road completed
and the perceived benefits it would bring were well documented. A primary benefit was
the facilitation of timber harvesting and shipping in the area.107 Other stated benefits in-
cluded fire control, improved public access, administrative efficiency, fuel economy, crea-
tion of a scenic parkway, and improvement of the local economy.10 8 Consideration of the
logging issue as a compelling interest was moot since the California Wilderness Act10 9 des-
ignated almost the entire disputed acreage as a wilderness area. As a result of such desig-
nation, no commercial enterprise such as logging could be maintained. 11 0 Congress did,
of course, omit the proposed road route from the statute; but if logging were no longer pos-
sible in the surrounding area, the strength of the government's argument diminished pro-
portionately with the usefulness of the road to the local timber business. Without that
interest, which may have justified a first amendment infringement absent the California
Wilderness Act,111 the other benefits and interests the government claimed in the project
ebb to insignificance. Without the increased logging, it was unlikely that new jobs within
the local area would be forthcoming. In fact, the district court found that no new jobs
102. Id. at 449.
103. Id. at 451.
104. Id. at 454.
105. Roy, 476 U.S. at 707-08.
106. Id. at 727 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
107. Northwest, 565 F. Supp. at 595.
108. Appendix at 100-01, Lyng.
109. Pub. L. No. 98-425, 98 Stat. 1619 (1984) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1132 (Supp. IV 1985)).
110. 16 U.S.C. § 1133 (1982).
111. Pub. L. No. 98-425, 98 Stat. 1619 (1984) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1132 (Supp. IV 1985)).
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would be produced if the road were completed but that there would merely be a transfer of
jobs already in existence."' As the court of appeals found and as the Forest Service admit-
ted, administrative efficiency and fire control would remain unaffected. 113 Finally, public
access, scenic driving, and fuel economy hardly justify the destruction of the Indians' reli-
gion.
The majority completely ignored the obvious and established compelling-interest anal-
ysis employed by the courts of appeal, preferring to use obscure logic and poor characteri-
zations in order to avoid the seemingly inevitable conclusion derived from the
compelling-interest analysis. As the majority viewed the case, "[i]ncidental effects of gov-
ernment programs, which make it more difficult to practice certain religions but which
have no tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs, [can-
not] require the government to bring forward a compelling justification for its otherwise
lawful actions."'114 This statement cannot be squared with Justice O'Connor's statement in
Roy. 115 Rendering one's religious practices impossible is coercive, not merely incidental.
There is nothing more contrary to one's devout religious beliefs than the inability to effec-
tively pursue those beliefs.
Using a structural analysis, the majority expressly dismissed the idea of the necessity of
showing a compelling governmental interest by stating that the Court "would . . . be re-
quired to weigh the value of every religious belief and practice that is said to be threatened
by any government program," 16 thereby representing the task as impracticable. By so do-
ing, the Court failed to recall the requirement of previous cases that the government must
demonstrate a compelling interest when the opposing party has proven that a constitutional
violation of the free exercise clause has occurred. 117 The Court, in fact, had previously
acknowledged that" 'only those interests of the highest order . . . can overbalance legiti-
mate claims to the free exercise of religion.' "118 Instead, the majority opted for the policy
that the religious beliefs of individuals cannot require the government to conduct its inter-
nal affairs in a manner consistent with those beliefs.119 In Roy, "internal affairs" meant the
maintenance of records, the distribution of aid payments, the avoidance of duplicate or in-
correct aid payments, and the prevention of fraud. 20 What the majority overlooked in
Lyng was that there is nothing purely "internal" about the Forest Service's management of
national forests. It is not, as the Court suggests, a case of a government's right to use, in
any way it wishes, its land.12" ' Regarding the G-O project, the Forest Service was con-
112. Northwest, 565 F. Supp. at 595-96.
113. Northwest, 795 F.2d at 695; see also 565 F. Supp. at 596.
114. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 450-51.
115. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
116. Lyng, 485 U.S. 457.
117. See Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 141 ("Such infringements [on the free exercise of religion] must be subjected to strict scrutiny and
[can] bejustified only by proof by the State of a compelling interest."); Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718 ("The state may justify an inroad
on religious liberty by showing that it is the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state interest."); Sherbert, 374
U.S. at 406 ("It is basic that no showing merely of a rational relationship to some colorable state interest would suffice; in this
highly sensitive constitutional area, '[olnly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible
limitation[.]' "(quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
118. Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 142 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972)).
119. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 448.
120. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
121. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 453.
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cerned with expense to the taxpayer.1 22 It held local meetings and promoted surveys to
determine the local sentiment about the project.
123 The National Wilderness System 124
makes it clear that wilderness areas, the Chimney Rock Section in this case, are for the use
and enjoyment of the American people. 125 Forest Service management priorities include
such items as outdoor recreation and wildlife preservation. 126 In the courts below the crea-
tion of new jobs and of a scenic highway was put forth by the government as evidence of a
compelling government interest. Certainly these considerations are not "internal" since
they involve not only the formulation of management policies for national forests but also
the effect of those policies on the surrounding areas and those who live there.
Notwithstanding the possibly purely internal nature of the government's land manage-
ment policies, history shows that the Indian people were to be given special consideration
with regard to such government policy. As the American Indian Religious Freedom Act
states, "[The Act's purpose is] to protect and preserve for the American Indians their inher-
ent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise [their] traditional religions."127 The
Act's legislative history more emphatically points out that "[t]he purpose [of the Act] is to
insure [sic] that the policies and procedures of various Federal agencies as they may impact
upon the exercise of traditional Indian religious practices are brought into compliance with
the constitutional injunction that Congress shall make no laws abridging the free exercise
of religion."128
Does the government have unbridled control to do with "its land" as it pleases if the poli-
cies regarding that land are to be considered in light of the needs of the American people in
general and, in this case, the effect those policies will have on the Indians and their religion
in particular? Certainly the formulation of land management policy is not simply "inter-
nal" in nature. Furthermore, the Indians' religious needs were not given the consideration
or deference required by the American Indian Religious Freedom Act. 129 No compelling
governmental interest exists for completing the G-O Road. Consequently, no justifiable
reason exists for the obvious violation of the free exercise clause of the first amendment as
it applies to the Yurok, Karok, and Tolowa Indians.
VI. CONCLUSION
With Lyng the Court constructed a nearly insurmountable barrier against free exercise
claims based on peculiar religious practices and the consequential effects of government
actions on those practices. Although the Court's rationale is difficult to understand, sev-
eral themes permeate the majority opinion and help to clarify how the Court may have de-
rived its conclusion. In Lyng the Court considered the nature of the Indians' religion.
Express words to the contrary, the eccentricity of the Indians' religion in relation to the
Judaeo-Christian "norm" apparently caused the Court some problem. The Court seemed
unable, or unwilling, to fully appreciate the effect that the G-O Road project would have
on the Indians' religion since their religion is site-specific with great emphasis placed on
122. Appendix at 101, Lyng.
123. Appendix at 104, Lyng.
124. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1976).
125. 16 U.S.C. § 1131 (1976).
126. 16 U.S.C. § 528 (1976).
127. 42 U.S.C. § 1996(1976).
128. H.R. REP. No. 95, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1262.
129. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1982).
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the land and on the place of worship, as opposed to a more mainstream religion in which
spiritual fulfillment is not necessarily dependent upon precise locations or geographic for-
mations.
The Court found no need to resort to the courts of appeals' compelling-interest analysis
nor the Court's own precedent of requiring the government to show a compelling interest
which would justify a free exercise clause infringement, precedent Justice O'Connor had
asserted should be followed in Roy. 130 In so doing, the Court did not have to balance the
interests of the Indians against those meager interests of the government; therefore, the
Court never had to consider the sufficiency of the overwhelming evidence in favor of the
Indians, evidence which included the government's own report that stated conclusively
that the G-O Road would lead to the destruction of the Indians' religion.
Finally, the Court implied that the government, whether regulating the payment of ben-
efits or regulating a national forest, need not defer to the religious needs of anyone as long
as the government action could be characterized as "internal." With such a vague stand-
ard, the Court established a nebulous sphere within which most government action could
conceivably be characterized, thereby defeating any free exercise claim.
In surveying these considerations, the Court seemed willing to recognize the religious
rights of others and to protect those rights from the oppressive effects of government con-
duct, but only within narrow bounds. The Court seemed less than willing to protect reli-
gious rights when the religion is, in the Court's opinion, an obscure, unorthodox one
whose recognition would require some deference by the government regarding formula-
tion of government policy and would therefore result in some degree of inconvenience to
the government. The Indians must suffer greatly from this policy. The Indians' religious
beliefs are perhaps the inverse of those beliefs held dear by most Americans, thereby mak-
ing the Indians' faith difficult to truly understand and appreciate. If the Indians' religion is
to be protected as vigorously as those faiths practiced by most Americans, the government
would have to make great concessions, particularly in the area of land management, due to
the site-specific nature of the Indians' religion. Unfortunately for the Indians, land is a
finite commodity, a long-term investment with a great potential for profit through its ex-
ploitation. Neither the Court nor the government seems willing to allow an obscure tribal
religion to interfere with such a valuable asset and revenue producer, even if unwillingness
and insensitivity result in the complete disregard of the Yurok, Karok, and Tolowa Indians'
first amendment rights as well as the possible destruction of their faith and way of life.
W Pemble DeLashmet
130. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
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